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UNREASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: 
EXAMINING EEOC V. ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL, 
INC. AND NONCOMPETITIVE REASSIGNMENT 
Amy Rankin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you work as a hiring manager for a hospital. Your 
primary concern when making hiring decisions is the safety and 
well-being of the hospital’s patients. Accordingly, it is your practice 
to staff hospital positions with the best-qualified applicants.  
Now, imagine you have two qualified applicants for a position 
that involves training nurses. Applicant #1 is clearly the better 
choice; she has more experience and more years of education in the 
field. However, by law, you must hire Applicant #2, who was 
recently demoted and has a final written warning on her record. 
Why? Because your circuit court of appeals has held that if an 
employer cannot reasonably accommodate an employee with a 
disability in their current position, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”) requires the employer to reassign that employee to a 
vacant position, regardless of whether there are more qualified 
applicants. Because Applicant #2 happens to be an employee with a 
disability, you must hire her over Applicant #1.1 
Currently, the circuits are split over whether the ADA mandates 
noncompetitive reassignment in scenarios such as the one described 
above.2 A majority of circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, have held that noncompetitive 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
University of California, Santa Barbara. Special thanks to the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for their helpful suggestions. 
 1. The facts of this hypothetical scenario are based on the facts of EEOC v. St. Joseph’s 
Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 2. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the ADA does not require noncompetitive reassignment), with EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 
693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ADA does require noncompetitive 
reassignment). 
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reassignment is not mandated by the ADA.3 The Seventh, Tenth, and 
D.C. Circuits, in contrast, have held that the ADA mandates 
noncompetitive reassignment.4 In EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, 
Inc.,5 the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on this debate, joining the 
majority of circuits that do not require noncompetitive 
reassignment.6 
Part II of this Comment will describe the facts of St. Joseph’s 
Hospital. Part III will discuss how the Eleventh Circuit arrived at the 
conclusion that the ADA does not mandate noncompetitive 
reassignment. Part IV will provide a brief background of the ADA 
and reasonable accommodation. Part V will present an analysis of 
the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split and explain why the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph’s Hospital is proper in light 
of the ADA, precedent, and policy considerations. Finally, part VI 
concludes that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph’s 
Hospital was proper and that should the Supreme Court weigh in on 
this circuit split, it should find that the ADA does not require 
noncompetitive reassignment. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Factual Background 
Leokadia Bryk (“Bryk”) worked as a nurse at St. Joseph’s 
Hospital (the “Hospital”) from January 2, 1990, until November 21, 
2011.7 Specifically, Bryk worked in the Hospital’s Behavioral Health 
Unit (“BHU”), “an in-patient psychiatric unit for patients who . . . 
[presented] an imminent danger to the patient or to others.”8 Patients 
in the BHU were housed in one of three units: a pediatric unit, a 
progressive unit, or an intensive unit.9 Bryk worked in the 
 
 3. See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC 
v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 
700 (5th Cir. 1995); Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004); Huber 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 4. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Midland 
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 5. 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (St. Joseph’s Hospital II). 
 6. Id. at 1345. 
 7. EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., No. 8:13–cv–2723–T–30TGW, 2015 WL 685766, at 
*1 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (St. Joseph’s Hospital I). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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progressive unit, which housed patients “that were ‘less violent’ than 
those in the intensive unit.”10 
On October 17, 2011, the Hospital demoted Bryk after she 
admitted that she had “allowed patients to sleep in the hallway 
during staff shortages.”11 Prior to her demotion, Bryk was employed 
as a Clinical Nurse III—a position that involved supervising other 
nurses in the unit and spending “a significant amount of time behind 
a desk.”12 After her demotion, Bryk became a Clinical Nurse II, 
which involved more patient interaction and more time in the 
hallways and patient rooms.13 
Between 2002 and 2009, Bryk developed a series of health 
problems.14 In 2002, Bryk began experiencing back pain and was 
subsequently diagnosed with spinal stenosis.15 Bryk also developed 
arthritis and, in 2009, underwent a hip replacement surgery.16 In 
2009, Bryk began using a cane in the psychiatric ward of the 
Hospital.17 
Susan Wright (“Wright”), the Hospital’s Director of Behavioral 
Health Operations, began supervising Bryk after her demotion in 
October 2011.18 Wright observed Bryk using a cane in the 
psychiatric ward and became concerned that patients could use the 
cane as a weapon.19 Wright raised this concern with Bryk, who then 
produced a doctor’s note recommending Bryk’s use of the cane in 
the psychiatric ward.20 
On October 21, 2011, the Hospital notified Bryk that due to 
safety concerns, she could no longer use her cane in the psychiatric 
unit.21 Because Bryk was recently demoted and had a final written 
warning in her personnel file, she was technically ineligible for a job 
transfer.22 However, the Hospital made an exception and gave Bryk 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. St. Joseph’s Hospital II, 842 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. St. Joseph’s Hosp. I, 2015 WL 685766, at *1. 
 19. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1338. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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thirty days to identify and apply for vacant positions.23 During this 
thirty-day period, Krista Sikes (“Sikes”), the Manager of Team 
Resources, was available to Bryk to answer questions and help with 
the application process.24 
At the beginning of Bryk’s thirty-day period, Bryk told Sikes 
that she was going on a previously scheduled two-week vacation and 
would not look at the Hospital’s job board until she returned.25 In the 
following thirty days, Bryk did not contact Sikes about the 
application process, the application portal, or the details of any 
position.26 In fact, Bryk did not apply for any position until three 
weeks into the thirty-day period.27 Of the seven hundred vacant 
positions listed on the job board, Bryk applied to seven.28 Of these 
seven positions, Bryk applied to three on the last day of the thirty-
day period and one after the period had already expired.29 Although 
the Hospital had authorized Bryk to apply to these positions as an 
internal candidate, she submitted all of her applications as an 
external applicant.30 
At trial, the parties focused on three positions that Bryk applied 
for: Education Specialist, Home Health Clinician, and Care 
Transition Coordinator.31 The Education Specialist position involved 
training nurses in a variety of units and conducting a monthly 
orientation of new hires.32 “Although Bryk met the requirements on 
the job post, [the hiring manager for the position] thought [Bryk] 
would need at least one or two years of ‘medical surgical experience’ 
and ‘more education experience, as well.’”33 Accordingly, the 
Hospital rejected Bryk’s application.34 
The Home Health Clinician position involved caring “for 
patients in their homes following their discharge from the hospital.”35 
The Hospital did not hire Bryk for this position because when Bryk 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1339. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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submitted her application, the Hospital had already filled the 
position.36 However, the Hospital claimed that even if the position 
were vacant, Bryk was not the best-qualified candidate for the 
position because she lacked both home health and wound care 
experience.37 
The Care Transition Coordinator position involved going to 
hospitals, gathering patient information, and coordinating post-
hospital home care.38 However, the Hospital said that this position 
was “not available and posted in error.”39 In any event, the Hospital 
claimed that even if the position were available, “Bryk was not 
sufficiently qualified because she lacked experience in surgery and 
acute treatment.”40 
Ultimately, the Hospital did not hire Bryk for any of the 
positions for which she applied.41 Accordingly, on November 21, 
2011, the Hospital discharged Bryk.42 
B.  Procedural History 
On October 23, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) filed suit on behalf of Bryk against the 
Hospital.43 The EEOC alleged that the Hospital violated the ADA in 
two ways. First, the EEOC claimed that by not allowing Bryk to use 
her cane in the psychiatric unit, the Hospital failed to provide Bryk 
with a reasonable accommodation.44 Second, the EEOC alleged that 
by making Bryk compete with other applicants for the vacant 
positions, the Hospital had violated the ADA.45 
Before trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The 
district court granted both motions in part, finding that although Bryk 
was considered a person with a disability for purposes of the ADA, 
“there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bryk was 
entitled to reassignment to either the Educational Specialist or the 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1339–40. 
 38. Id. at 1340. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1340. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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Care Transition Coordinator position.”46 In a subsequent order, the 
district court further held that the Hospital was not required to 
reassign Bryk to a vacant position without competition.47 Instead, the 
court explained, whether an employee with a disability “had to 
compete with others for the vacant position is one factor, out of 
many, that the jury may consider regarding the reasonableness of the 
accommodation.”48 In the following section, this Comment will 
focus on the Eleventh Circuit’s review of this holding. 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
In St. Joseph’s Hospital II, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that 
Bryk was both “disabled” and a “qualified individual” under the 
ADA.49 Thus, it turned to the question of whether the Hospital 
violated the ADA by making Bryk compete with other applicants for 
vacant positions at the Hospital.50 To answer this question, the 
Eleventh Circuit first turned to the text of the ADA, noting that while 
the ADA requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an 
employee with a disability, “it does not say how an employer must 
do that.”51 Instead, the statute “offers a non-exhaustive list of 
accommodations that ‘may’ be reasonable,” and reassignment to a 
vacant position is but one item on this list.52 The court noted that the 
use of the word “may” in this context implied not that reassignment 
would always be reasonable.53 
After analyzing the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirement, the Eleventh Circuit turned to precedent. The court 
analogized the Hospital’s best-qualified applicant hiring policy to the 
seniority system at issue in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 
391 (2002).54 
In Barnett, the Supreme Court “was confronted with the issue of 
whether an employer, in order to comply with the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation duty, must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1345. 
 49. Id. at 1344. 
 50. See id. at 1345. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
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position in spite of the fact that the employer’s longstanding seniority 
system would award the position to a more senior, non-disabled 
employee.”55 There, the Supreme Court established a test to be used 
in situations where an employer has claimed that a request for 
reassignment by an employee with a disability would violate a 
disability-neutral hiring policy.56 Under the first step of the Barnett 
test, an employee must show that the requested accommodation is 
“reasonable in the run of cases.”57 If the employee makes this 
showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to show that granting the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship under the 
particular circumstances of the case.”58 If, however, the employee 
fails to show that the accommodation is reasonable in the run of 
cases, “the employee can still prevail by showing that special 
circumstances warrant a finding that the accommodation is 
reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.”59 
Ultimately, the majority in Barnett held that in the run of cases, 
it would not be reasonable for an employee’s ADA request to trump 
an existing seniority system because of the loss of benefits and other 
practical difficulties that might accompany a departure from an 
existing seniority system.60 Drawing on this result, the court in St. 
Joseph’s Hospital held that, like the seniority system in Barnett, the 
Hospital’s best-qualified applicant policy trumped Bryk’s request for 
reassignment.61 Applying the first step of the Barnett test, the Court 
held that, “[r]equiring reassignment in violation of an employer’s 
best-qualified hiring or transfer policy is not reasonable ‘in the run of 
cases.’”62 As explained by the court: 
As things generally run, employers operate their businesses 
for profit, which requires efficiency and good performance. 
Passing over the best-qualified job applicants in favor of 
less-qualified ones is not a reasonable way to promote 
 
 55. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 933 (2003). 
 56. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346; Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–03. 
 57. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 
356, 361 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403. 
 61. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346. 
 62. Id. 
50.4_RANKIN_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/19  8:34 PM 
824 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:817 
efficiency or good performance. In the case of hospitals, 
which is this case, the well-being and even the lives of 
patients can depend on having the best-qualified personnel. 
Undermining a hospital’s best-qualified hiring or transfer 
policy imposes substantial costs on the hospital and 
potentially on patients.63 
The court bolstered its conclusion by noting that the purpose of the 
ADA was not to mandate preferential hiring of employees with 
disabilities or “turn nondiscrimination into discrimination,” but 
rather to ensure employers provide employees with disabilities with 
“meaningful equal employment opportunities.”64 Accordingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the holding of the lower court.65 
IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”).66 Its purpose, among other things, was to “assure equality 
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic 
self-sufficiency for [individuals with disabilities].”67 
The predecessor to the ADA was the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.68 However, while the Rehabilitation Act applied only to 
“federal government agencies, government contractors, and 
recipients of federal funds,” the ADA is significantly more 
expansive, applying “to enterprises in both public and private 
sectors.”69 
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against 
qualified individuals on the basis of disability.70 The statute defines a 
“qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1346–47. 
 65. Id. at 1347. 
 66. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994). 
 67. Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 68. Carrie L. Flores, Note, A Disability Is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act Does Not Entitle Disabled Employees to Automatic Reassignment, 43 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 195, 202 (2008). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
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the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”71 The 
Act prohibits discriminatory practices such as: refusing to hire a 
qualified individual because of his or her disability, firing a qualified 
individual because of his or her disability, and refusing to promote a 
qualified individual because of his or her disability.72 In this sense, 
the ADA is similar to other non-discrimination bills passed in the 
second half of the twentieth century, such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”).73 However, the ADA departs from 
these statutes in that the ADA is not merely an antidiscrimination 
statute.74 Title VII and the ADEA prohibit employers from making 
discriminatory hiring decisions, but “do not impose any affirmative 
obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily 
performing the essential functions of the job.”75 The ADA, in 
contrast, does impose an affirmative obligation on employers. This is 
seen in the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement. 
B.  Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment 
Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against an employee 
with a disability if the employer fails to make reasonable 
accommodation for the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified employee, unless providing the accommodation 
would cause an undue hardship on the employer.76 The statute 
provides that reasonable accommodation may include: “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to 
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, 
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or 
 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 73. Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1045, 1047 (2000). 
 74. Id. at 1047–48; see PETER BLANKE ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 
55 (3d ed. 2014) (“The explicit command that employers accept the burden of paying for 
accommodations—up to the undue hardship ceiling—arguably sets the ADA apart from other 
civil rights legislation and has created significant theoretical and practical disputes.”). 
 75. Befort & Donesky, supra note 73, at 1047. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A). 
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interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities.”77 
The ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement has been 
heavily litigated.78 Reassignment, in particular, has proven to be a 
subject of much controversy.79 Reassignment is typically the 
“reasonable accommodation of last resort,” meaning it is generally 
employed only when an employer has exhausted all other 
alternatives that might allow an employee to remain in their 
position.80 The primary question that has arisen regarding 
reassignment is whether this form of reasonable accommodation 
requires employers to reassign employees with disabilities to vacant 
positions, even where there are more-qualified applicants.81 In 
Barnett, as discussed above, the Supreme Court addressed this issue 
in the context of a seniority system.82 However, in its 5-4 decision, 
the deeply divided court appeared to resolve this issue only in part. 
Although the court held that noncompetitive reassignment was 
unreasonable “in the run of cases[,]” it did not address whether 
noncompetitive reassignment would be reasonable in the context of 
non seniority-based hiring systems.83 Thus, courts have been left to 
determine whether this holding can be extended to other 
nondiscriminatory hiring policies. Barnett’s five separate opinions 
indicate that even the Supreme Court has not come to a consensus on 
this issue. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In the following section, this Comment will provide an analysis 
of the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split. It will then defend 
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in St. Joseph’s Hospital and discuss 
why its holding is appropriate in light of the ADA, precedent, and 
policy considerations. 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added). 
 78. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: 
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 440–41 (2002). 
 79. Id. at 441. 
 80. Befort & Donesky, supra note 73, at 1085. 
 81. Befort, supra note 78, at 453–55. 
 82. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 403. 
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A.  The Circuit Split 
In the period since Barnett, courts have come to varying 
conclusions regarding whether noncompetitive reassignment is 
mandated in non seniority-based hiring systems.”84 In Huber v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.,85 the Eighth Circuit used the reasoning of Barnett 
to conclude that the ADA “does not require an employer to reassign 
a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a 
reassignment would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of 
the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.”86 The Seventh 
Circuit, in contrast, has read Barnett to require reassignment without 
competition.87 
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Huber.88 Many 
believed that the Supreme Court would take this opportunity to 
ultimately resolve the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split. 
However, the parties settled before oral argument commenced.89 
Thus, the circuits remain split. 
The circuits that have weighed in on this issue have primarily 
taken one of two positions. The circuits that have held in favor of 
noncompetitive reassignment have typically held “that Congress 
designed the ADA to compel employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for disabled employees, not simply to consider 
providing accommodations. If reassignment is optional, the argument 
goes, the ADA’s reassignment provision lacks any bite.”90 These 
circuits have also emphasized that this conclusion is appropriate in 
light of the EEOC’s Interpretative Guidance, which states that 
 
 84. Michael Creta, The Accommodation of Last Resort: The Americans with Disabilities Act 
and Reassignments, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1708 (2014). 
 85. 486 F.3d 480 (2007). 
 86. Id. at 483. 
 87. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). Prior to Barnett, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the ADA does not mandate noncompetitive reassignment. EEOC v. 
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). However, in United Airlines, the 
circuit reversed its course in light of Barnett. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 760. 
 88. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1074 (2007) (granting certiorari in part). 
 89. Lyle Denniston, Granted Case on Disability Rights Dismissed, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 
2008, 10:08 A.M.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/01/court-seeks-advice-on-settling-worker-
claims. 
 90. Nicholas Dorsey, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and Need 
for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 445 (2009). 
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reassignment must not involve any competition for the vacant 
position.91 
The circuits that have rejected mandatory reassignment, 
however, have largely contended that forcing employers to reassign 
employees with disabilities to vacant positions constitutes 
“affirmative action with a vengeance” and is simply not warranted by 
the ADA.92 As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Dalton v. Subaru–
Isuzu Auto., Inc.: 
[W]e have been unable to find a single ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act case in which an employer has been 
required to reassign a disabled employee to a position when 
such a transfer would violate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory policy of the employer, . . . and for good 
reason. The contrary rule would convert a 
nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference 
statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the 
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable 
imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled 
employees.93 
These circuits have also noted that if Congress intended to require 
noncompetitive reassignment—a controversial proposition—“it 
would certainly not have done so by slipping the phrase 
‘reassignment to a vacant position’ in the middle of this list of 
reasonable accommodations.”94 Accordingly, these courts have 
found that mandating noncompetitive reassignment constitutes an 
impermissible expansion of the ADA.95 
B.  Mandatory Noncompetitive Reassignment  
Is Contrary to Congressional Intent 
Although the ADA requires that employers make reasonable 
accommodations for workers with disabilities, it does not provide 
that employees with disabilities receive preferential treatment over 
 
 91. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999); EEOC, 
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act at 44 (1999). 
 92. Dorsey, supra note 90, at 445–46; see Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029. 
 93. Dalton v. Subaru–Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 94. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., 
dissenting). 
 95. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1182 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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equally qualified (or more qualified) employees without disabilities. 
In fact, in preparing the ADA, Congress noted that its intent was to 
level the playing field and give individuals with disabilities a way to 
fully engage in society and business96, not to tip the scales in favor of 
individuals with disabilities. As stated in Humiston-Keeling: 
The contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute 
into a mandatory preference statute, a result which would be 
both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the 
ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and 
coworkers of disabled employees. A policy of giving the 
job to the best applicant is legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory.97 
Additionally, if Congress wished to mandate noncompetitive 
reassignment, it could have done so explicitly. Instead, Congress 
couched the reassignment language within a list of ways that an 
employer may reasonably accommodate an employee.98 This 
language indicates that reasonable accommodation does not require 
reassignment in all cases, but rather, that such a form of reasonable 
accommodation may be reasonable in certain instances, but not in 
others. 
C.  Barnett Does Not Mandate Noncompetitive Reassignment 
Barnett has provided little guidance for courts struggling to 
understand the parameters of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirement and, specifically, reassignment. Since this decision was 
handed down, courts have used its reasoning to come to dramatically 
different conclusions about whether the ADA mandates 
noncompetitive reassignment in non seniority-based systems.99 The 
spectrum of conclusions reached by lower courts is itself evidence of 
the limited value of Barnett in the context of non seniority-based 
hiring systems. Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari and 
 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2016). 
 97. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028. 
 98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (“[R]easonable accommodation may include . . . job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and 
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”) (emphasis added). 
 99. Compare St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016), with EEOC v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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resolves this split, courts will continue to use Barnett’s reasoning to 
come to vastly different conclusions. By granting certiorari in Huber, 
the Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to take up the 
mandatory reassignment circuit split. Thus, it is likely that this issue 
will ultimately be decided by the highest court. 
D.  Noncompetitive Reassignment Is Unduly Burdensome 
When the Supreme Court inevitably takes up the mandatory 
reassignment circuit split, it should hold not only that noncompetitive 
reassignment is unwarranted by the ADA, but also that it is 
unwarranted in light of policy considerations. 
The ADA does not mandate that employers provide employees 
with perfect accommodation. Rather, it mandates reasonable 
accommodation. Mandating noncompetitive reassignment goes too 
far. It imposes a burden on employers to make perfect 
accommodations for employees with disabilities at the expense of an 
employer’s legitimate business interests and the interests of other 
applicants. A business has a duty not only to its consumers, but also 
to its employees, to hire the most qualified candidates in order to 
preserve efficiency, provide quality products, and provide competent 
services. In a hospital setting, the placement of a potentially lesser-
qualified candidate can have a significant impact on the health and 
safety of patients. To require an employer to abandon its best-
qualified applicant policy in such circumstances is undesirable for 
both employers and patients alike. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The circuit split regarding noncompetitive reassignment has 
serious repercussions for employers and employees across the nation. 
Ultimately, it is likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to 
resolve this split in the near future. If it does, the Supreme Court 
should find that the ADA does not require noncompetitive 
reassignment  
